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Abstract
In this paper, we study severa,l  general equilibrium  models in whic.h the agents in  a.rr  economy muot
decide on the appropriete  level of immigration  into  the  country.  Immigration  does not  enter directly
into the native agents'utility functions,  and natives  have  identical preferences  over consumption  goods.
However, da,tivee  may be endowed with  difierent  anounts  of capital, which alone gives rise to alternative
levels of desired immigration,  We show that  the natives' preferences over desired levels of immigration
are  influenced  by the prospect  that new immigrants  will be voting in the future, which ltray  lead  to higher
taxation  to finance government speadiug from which they will  benefit.  We also show that  changes  in the
degree  of intemational capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital arrong natives,  the wealth or
poverty  of the immigrant  pool, and the future  loting  dghts and entitlements of immigrarts  can all have
a dra.matic efiect on the equilibrium  immigration  and taxation  policies.
+Tbe comments of numerous participalts  and discussants at  conferences snd  seminars are gratefully  acknol'ledged,  6s ere
the  suggestions of aoonymous ref€rees end a cGeditor.  In  particular,  the  suthors  would  like  to  thank  Kjetil  Storesletten  for
numerous  helpful  comments oD an earlier  draft.  The  views expre6sed here are solely  those of the  authors  arrd do not  re8ect
thGe  of the Federal Reserve Bank  of Dallas or the Federal Res€rve System.
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In this paper, we study several  general equilibrium  models in which the agents  in an economy must decide
on the appropriate ler.el  of immigration into the coultry.  I-mrnigration does  not enter directly into the natire
agents' utility  functions, and natir"es  have identical preferences  over consumption goods. Howwer, natives
may be end.owed  with  d.ifierent amoutrts of capital,  which alone gives rise to alternative levels of desired
immigration.  We shoq/  that the natires'  preferences  over desired levels  of immigration  are influenced by the
prospect that  new irnrnigrants will  be voting in  the future,  which may lea.d  to higher taxation  to fiItance
goverrment spending from which they will  benefit. We also show that  changes  in the degree  of international
capital mobilitS  the distribution  of initial  capital  among natives, the wea.lth  or povertJr  of the im.migra,rrt
pool, and the future  voting  rights  and eutitlements of immigrauts  can all have a dramatic  efiect on the
equilibrium immigration  and taxation policies.
Our analysis is novel in several respects. First  and most importa.nt, the analysis inte$ates  ihe political
economy of inrmigration  a.nd  the political  economy of taxatiol  and government speuding, both  of which
have been examined sepaxately  but  not,  to our knowledge, jointly.  In  many countries, discussions  of the
impact of inunigration  focus almost e<clusir."ely  on immigrants' consumption of publicly provided goods and
sewices. Recently in the US, atteution ha-<  turned as well to the role which naturalized citizens play in the
determination of domestic election outcomes. One surprising result in our analysis is that  the addition  of
immigrants who a"re  both poorer than th€ native popr. a.tiotr and permitted to l'ote over redistribution  does
not necessaxily  result in higher taxes and transfers.  If  initial  weatth i::equaliw  in the economy is low, the
tax rate may artually  /cll  as immigrants axe  admitted.
Secondly,  our analysis eca.rnines  the effect of immigration  from the perspectire of natives' utfity  levels,
rather than income. In so doing, we also document why measures  of the impact of immigration which focus
solely on natives' income may be inappropriate.  Such measures  may be misleadhg  because  they  ignore
the efiects which the change  il  factor prices engendered  by irnrnigration can have or  natives' allocation of
resources  over time.  Dependiag on the period sa"rnpled,  natives'incomes  may be inffeasing in the level of
immigration, while their liletime utilities  axe  in fact falling as they are making intertemporal tradeoffs which
they rould  otherwise not. In this respect, the dynamic nature of our analysis is crucial-
Finally,  we study how the degree  of international  capital  mobility  a.ffects  natives' preferences  over the
immigration  and taxation  issues-l This turns out to be impoftant-if  inflors  of labor are accompa.nied  by
substantial inflows of physical capital,  the effect of immigration  on factor prices and, ultimately,  natives'
utilities,  is [kely  to be smal]- We show  that in the extreme, albeit unrealistic, case  of perfect capital mobility,
natives a,re  in fart  indifferent with  respect to the level of immigration.  In a world of less-thar-perfect capital
mobilit5  ho*.erer, gmeral eqfibrium  price effects arrd the effects of immigratior  ou domestic fiscal poJicy
rWe would like to thank the co-ediior for encouaaging  us to puNue this issue,combine to give shaxp  natile  preferences  over the level of immigratiou.
The importa.nce  of immigration  in the world economy is often under-appreciated. According to United
Nations data, in 1990 there were 120 million  'foreign-born  persons" in 214 countries. Tbis a.rnou:rts  to 2-3
percent of the world's population, or a population that  is roughly the size of Japan. This percentage  of the
world's population  has stayed fowhly  constant bt least since 1965.2 Immigration  patterns difier radically
across  courtdes;  The ftaction of the population that  is "foreign-boru"  ranges  from 0.035%  in Egypt to over
90% in the United Arab Emirates. Australia, Ca.nada,  and the US, which account for only 5% of the world's
population, have received  three quaxters  of the world's immigrants in the 1990's. Immigration  accormts  for
40% of the US population grollth  rate.
There is also  evidence  that immigration is likely to become  a much more important issue  in the future.  One
reason  is the secular decline in tra.nsportation costs that has permitted even  unskilled workers to move great
distanc$.  But additionslly, the fall in fertility  rates of industrialized countries implies that the popu.lation  of
ma,ny  of these  economies  may become  sznaller in the abseuce  of immigration-  For exa"rnple,  there is currently
not a single coruriry in Euope  that  has a fertility  rate suficient  to maintain its cu-rrent  population in the
long run, in the abseuce  of immigration-  Giren the agiug of the population of industdal  countries, this has
dire implications for the ability  of these countries to maintain  their  current generous  levels of gor,"ernmeut-
funded social and retirement prograrx!-  As Canada has already learned, increased  immigratiou  is one way
to alleviate this financial er.igmcy.s
The intent  of this paper is to shed some  light  on lhe  economic  factors which may il:Buence the voting
patterns of domestic citizens on the issue  of immigration.  Additioually,  we emphasize  the dynamic aspects  of
this qrestion, $'hich would appea,r  to be important.  Altering  imrnigration policy in one period will  influence
the quantity  of the factors of production, factor prices and the distribution  of income in future periods. If
citizens then make subsequmt policy decisions,  those decisions  will be afiected as  well by current immigration
policy.  If  agents axe forward-looking, then they should take these future cotrsequences  into Mcount when
forrnulating preferencea  o\,€r the number of immigrants to admit  today.
There is some  recent work that  is related to the approach adopted below- Storeslettm  [18] conducts an
empirical analysis of the effect that  immi$ation  can hare on the fiscal position of the US federal govern-
ment.  Beuhabib [4] studies a simple model in  which agents' motives are determined by purely economic
considerations  over alternative econonic policies, though the analysis does not contain many of the details
zsee Maitin  {141  for a comprehensive  snalysh of immtration  patterns. He describes  much of the UN dats described  here.
There is also monthly intemet newsletter titled  the "MigratioD Nevrs" that  reporis on world-wide immigrBtion issues. lt  is
availablc  at httpr//migrstion.ucdavis.edu/mn/mntxt.htm.
sEberstadt [11]  describes  this data, which is forthcoming itr the United Nations volume etttilled Wodtl Poptlati.on  Protpectu.
For exemple, in the post-unification  Eastern Germany, the lertility  rate is l€ss than  one birth  per woosn  per liletirne.  Slmilatly,
Japan ha3 hod sub-replaceEeDt fertility  for over 40 y€ars.studied in the model below. Cul<ierma,n,  Hercowitz and Pines [8] also study inmigration,  but  they look at
an environment in which the potential mi$ants  mu6t make optimal decisions  in consid€ring whether or not
to mor€.  Neither of these paperc considers  the pot€ntial  efiect, over several periods, on the quantities of
both  capital and labor,  together with  the changes  i:r their  factor prices, that  result from the endogenous
determination of the le.r.'el  of immigratiotr, nor do they study how immigration can influence the future levels
of gorerrunent spending or taxation through the outcome of the voting mecha,nism.4
There is also a subetantia.l  body of empiricai work that  seeks  to measure  the costs or benefits of immi-
gration irrto the US. Borjas ([5],[6]) prwides good references  for this literature, while appea.ring  to conclude
that  the benefits of iurmigration  axe at best minimal,  and in  farct the costs to residents ca^n  be la,rge- In
contrast) Caxd 14 filds  the efiect of the 1980 immigration  of people into Mia,mi during the Mariel Boatlift
to hare had a negligible efiect on the unskilled labor Daxket.
The remfider  of this paper is organized as follor€.  In the nort  section, we describe the economic  envi-
ronment in tenns of the consumption and savings droices facing natives a"nd  immigrants, the deterrnination
of the supply of foreign-ovrned  capital and the economy's  aggregate  production possibilities. In section 3, we
turn  to the political  decisions  which agents il  the economy face, describing the nature and timing  of these
decisions  and the method by which we construct the economy's equilibrium.  Iu  section 4, we analyze the
behavior of the ecouomy  mrmerically under eJternatia.e  €ssumptions  about the degree  of inequality in natil€s'
initial  endowments  of capital, the degree  of iniernational  capital mobility, the voti:rg rights and mtitlements
of immigra^nts  and the relative wealth or por€rty  of the immigrant  pool. We ofer  some  concluding remarks
in section 5. An appmdk  contairu a proof of a proposition given in section 4 and an a,nalysis  of a special
case  in which the equilibriurn tax rate has a pa.rticu.la.rly  simple closed-form expression.
2  The economic environment
We analyze an economy which lasts for thlee periods.  There is no uncertainty, and agents ale assumed
to  have perfect foresight.  We do not  model irnmigrants'  incentives to esigrete;  rather,  we asswne that
there is an unlimited  supply of identical potmtial  inmigrants,  relative to tbe initial  size of the economy
urder  consideration. Immigrants, if admitted,  arrive in the second  period.  They then must ma,ke  optimal
employment and saving decisions. In the second period, all  agents in  the economy who are en-ftanchised
will  rote  orer the lerel of iucome taxation,  and resulting redistribution,  which will  take place h  the last
period. In our benchmark case,  immigra.nts  a.rrive  with  only labor to supply and are enlranchised  for voting
in the second period.  We also consider the cases  where immigrants arrive with  substantial capital, a.re  not
aThe efiect  of immigration on factor prices  should  not be miniDaized.  Marth  I15]  stBtes  thst ls  d pric€s  in the US sre betweeE
10 and 20 percent higher because  of the expected  aroilability  of immigrant workels. Given the strong political influence  that
some farm  states car  exhibit,  thj.s can translate  into  a non-trivial  efiect  on actual  policies.  Borjas  [6] and  Card  [7] certainly
focus on factor prices in the labor market in their empirical analyses.permitted to vote once admitted and are not entitled to transfers.
A  novel feature of  this  model is that  the policy  adopted in  period  one, determining the  amount of
immigration,  will  i:rfluence the future  distribution  of ilcome  a.rrd  therefore the preferences  of agents for
future income taxation, which will  be determined in the subsequent  period. There is a sequential nature to
the voting scherne  d,nd  if  there is irnrnigration,-the median voter in one period will  not, in geueral, be the
median roter  in a subsequent  period, That is, agents in period one-the  economy's  natives-must  cotrsider
how their decision  to admit immigrants will influence who will  be the mediar voter over tax policy in period
two. This is an iurportant ingredient which will enhance  our understanding of the political  mechanism  which
determines these policy parameters.
2.1  The  decision problem  of initial  residents
We  assume that  there  axe a continuum  of  initial  residents,  or  'natives',  and  the  size of  this  population  is
normalized  to  unity-  Natives  in  this  economy  face the  most  interesthg  decision  problem.  Each  uative  is
endowed with  some amount  of capital,  tr,  in  the first  period-  The  native  divides  this  capital,  an all-purpose
good,  into  consumption  in  the  first  period  and  savings  for  the  second  period.  In  the  second period,  the
natire  receives his  or  her  hcome  ftom  savings,  aud  income  from  labor  services,  which  the  native  supplies
inelastically.  The  labor  endo*ments  of  all  agents,  both  natives  and  immigra.nts,  a,re norma.lized  to  one.
Income  il  period  tqro  is again  divided  between  consumption  and  savings  for  period  three.  Also  in  period
2,  the  agenis  vote  on  the  level  of  taxation  and  transfers  that  a.re to  be  imposed  ir  the  following  period.
In  the  third  and  fi.nal period,  agents simply  consume their  income,  a.fter any  taxes  and  transfers  have been
completed.
For computational  pu.rposes, we assume that  a lative  agent's  uti[ty  over consumption  in the three periods
is described  by  the  time-separable,  logarithmic  utility  function
Ios  (cl) + B  loc  (c2)  + f2los(cr). (1)
All  natives  have the  same preferences over the  tb.ree conaumption  goods.  A  native  endowed initially  with  A1
units  of cspital  faces the  following  budget  constraints  for  consumption  in  the  three  periods:
cr I  sz:  kt,
Qls3:r2s2as2,
and
ca  :  (1 -  0) (r3s3  *  t,:) + r,
where  s;11  denotes  savhgs  in  period  i,  and  14  aud  ry  denote  the  period-i  real  wage  rate  and  rental  rate
of  capital,  respectively.  I  is the  income  tax  rate  irr period  three.  We  assume that  the  revenue which  thegovernment collects is rebated to agents in  the economy in  the form of a lumpsum  transfer, r,  which is
identical across  agents. The traasfer r  might also be viewed as representing some  sort of public good, or a
tra,rnfer in kind that substitutes for pri\rate conflrmption.s We will  say more below about the determination
of the level of d and r.
2.2  The decision problem  of immigrants
lnmigra.nts  a.re  assruned  to anive  at the beginning of period two.  For convenience,  we denote the size of
the i:nmigra"nt population  as M.  Since the size of the initial  resident population  is unity,  the size of the
total population during perlods two and three is then I *  M  = -L. As a benchmark, it is assumed  that these
agents  hare no capital, but  hare a single udt  of labor-6 The preferences  of immigrants are similar to those
of residents over consumption in periods tno  and three, and a,re  giveu by
tog  (c2)  + 0los(c:).
Immigra.nts  must maximize  utility  subject  to the following  budget  constraints
c2+4:A2,
aJlo
ca  :  (1 -  0) (res: + us) + z.
In the benchmark case  where funmigrants  arrive with  only a unit  of labor to supply, an immigrant's income
in period two consists  solely of wage income-i.e.,  y2 :  111r.  If irnmigrants also have some  amou.nt  of capital
kM , tben y2 :  wz I  rzkM .
2,3  Foreign capital
Not only ca.n  immigrants erter  this economy,  but there may be international  movements  of physical capital
as well-that  is, inflows of immigra.uts  may be accomparried  by inflows of physical capital ftom abroad. This
is what one would expect, if physical capital were perfectly mobile across  countries, and if capital aad labor
are complemeuts in the domeetic country.  If  rates of return  on physical capital  a,re  initially  equal across
countries, then a movement of labor into the domestic economy,  other things equal, will  raise the retu.rn to
cepital there relative to other countries.
owhat  we have in rDind is that  governmetrts  sppea. obtigated  to ofrer a certain amount of public services,  even to newly
arrived immigiants,  These corld  take ihe form of r,'clfare  or income-subsidy  paymetrts,  but  also subsidies  for education or
health-care,  or non-excludable  goods  suc,h  as roads  or parks. This certainly s€emed  to be a pertinent area  of cotrcertr  for msny
people  itr California in recent discussions  about immigration policies.
6That the immigrants ar€ relatively poor js a very plausible benchmark, Martin  [14] describes  the  "typicsl"  rmmtgrant
around the world as  someone  who is young, st or near the bottom of the emigration country's job ladder, aud often ftom rural
Aleaa. We srill  consider below the case where immigrants  are relatively  ch.To ma,ke  this aspect of the model as simple as possible, we assume  that  foreign agents a.re  risk-neutral
inrcstors who face  a cost of adjusting their capital holdings in the domestic economy.  Precisely,  foreign agents
have linear utility  or€r consurnption in all tbree periods, with  discount factor B. Given some  initial  amourrt
of capital located in the domestic economy,  call it  Kfl,  they choose  ralues of Kf  and If  to maximize
ql1czlEzcz
subject  to q:  F$f  -  K{i,  -  t  (K!,K*).  Here,  fi  represents  the period-i return to capitat located  in
the domestic economy,  net of any taxes-in  particular,  iz  :  rz  and fu :  (7 -  0) ry.  Note that  the return  to
foreign capital invested b  the domestic economy i:r the third  period is also taxed at the rate d. The cost of
adjustment is captured U+  I  (rc{,Xfrr),  which we assume  to have the quadratic form
-t  (K{,K{+,):  }Wr 
- K,1,)'.
Utility  maxiuization  by foreign agents gives rise to the followi:rg simple rule governing the evolution of
foreigu-ovrned  capital located in the domestic economy:
1
K:-.,:Ki  *.  (6i;+r-1)
for  i:1,2.
This decision  rule implies thet  the higher is the net-of-tax domestic rate of return to capital, relative to
1/p,  the laxger will  be the inflow of foreign capital.  llere,  .^ 2  0 represents  an adju8tment co6t para.meter
that  influmces the desired change in the capital stock; the smaller is ),  the larger will  be the response  ir
foreign capital to s charge in the domestic uet rate of return  to capital.  At  one extreme, if  )  :  0, then
there are no adjustment costs, which implies that  there is perfect capital mobility  between economies. In
this case,  equilibrium requires that the a.fter-tax domestic returns to capital in each  period obey i;+t  :  7/F.
At the other e<treme,  if .\:  *m,  thm.Kfl,  :  Kf  for rt  :  1,2; il  also,  Kfl  :  0, then we axe  bsck to the
closed-economv  case.?
7lt is Dot clear how one is to measure  the degree  of capital mobility. It  is fairly clear that  "financial capital," in the form
of deposite  iB financial institutiods, is very mobile. On the other hatrd, physical  capital, vhich  is tangible capitsl used  in the
productiotr  of othq  goods, is clearly  less mobile.  Since the ielevant  co[cept  here is the latter,  we feel it  is iEportaDt  to stlrdy
economies  where  there is less  than perfect capital mobility. Furthermore,  recent  empirical studies  indicate that models  in which
there  ale  no adjustment  costs for  capital  have s greet  desl of dificulty  accounti$g  for  observed nows in  international  cspital
(see  Baxter and Cmcini  [3], Me[doua [12], Mendoza and Tesar {13]). There is other res€s,rch  thst  adopts a slightly difieretrt
approech  from our adjustment cost set-up-for  example,  Backus,  l(ehoe, and Kydland [1j use  s "time-to-build'  structure while
Bockus,  Kehoe, ard Kydlstrd [2] use  an Armington  aggr€gator. In both case$,  the efiects  of these  modifications  are similar to
the eflect of adjustnrent  costs, in  that  closs-couBtry  movements of physicel  capital  are slowed in  order to b  ng the  Eodels  in
line with  obs€rved ho\,€ments  of physical cspital
(2)2,4  Production  technology
Production, which takes place only in periods two and three, is underta,ken  by competitive firms with  access
to a constart-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production technology,  using capital and labor as inputs-that
is,F(K;,L)=AKf  LI-",for  i':2,3.  Obviously,  Ka ard.  L; represmt the ag$egate  stocks  of capital and
Iabor  employed  in period  i, respectively.  \.ltrhen  fore.ign  capital is presenb,  aggregate  capital K; is the sum  of
aggregate  domestic savings  for period i-"'call  it K;D-and  foreign capital errployed in the domestic economy
ilr period  i, so
Kt:  K? +  K{
is the aggregate  stock of capital emplc,yed  in period i.6 As both natives and irnmigrants inelaatically supply
one nnit  of labor per person, the aggregate  labor input  in periods two a.nd  tbree is simply Li:  L :  | + M.
In equilibrium,  the factor prices r;  and ru; will  obey the marginsJ con.ditions
and
r;:  h(K;,L;)  :  oA(Kt/L)'-r




3  Immigrafion  and
3.L  The timing  of decisions
Immigration policy, which is here simply the number M of immigrants to admit, is decided  in the first period,
prior to the trati!€  residents' consumption-savings  decision. Redistributir"e fiscal policy, sunmarized by the
tax parameter d, is determined in the second  period, also prior to agents' consumption-savings  decisions. To
describe the political  equilibrium, we use the sta.ndard  model of two-party competition, though in this case
there  is a sequence  of elections,  earh over  a single  issue.g
Our  choice of a sequential ftamework is prirua,rily motivated  by our  interest in  what  happeus when,
through irrunigration, the size  of the voting population and the distribution  of income among  voters, change.
It  would be inappropriate to study this in a framework with  a single first-period election ol'er both M  and
0, in which, necessa,rily,  only natives would pa.rticipate. By the sarne  toket,  a seEuence  of electiom in which
both of lhe issues  are decided-say,  for o<ample, iI natives vote on a level immigration  a.nd  taxation  to be
implemented in period two, and then natives and newly-a,rrived immigrants vote over fiuther  i$migration
and taxation for period three-would  seem  to detract from the main mechanisms  at work, as well as  rendering
8In our experiments  below, rre co4sider a ca3€  where immigra[ts  arrive  iE period  two bringitrg  a quantity  of capital  ,f4f,  in
whidr case  aggrcgate  capital in pe  od two becomes  K2:  l(rD 4 K{  + Ky  -
9A more complete  description  of the underlying twc.party competition is give[ in the tecbdcal appcndix, which i6  al'ailable
on rcquest  from the authoru.the analysis hopelessly  complicated. Proving the e<istence  of, and ca.lculatilg, a majority-rule  equilibriumr0
in a single election with  a two-dimensional issue  space  is diftcult  even in more idealized settings, let alone
irr a model with  as many equilibrium  interactions as are present here.11
The issue in tbe fust  round of voting is the number of immigra.nts to admit.  We will  consider the ca.se
where the issue space  is a closed  interval ftom zero tosome maximum rumber  of immigrants. Even though
natir"es  have identical preferences  over consunptior  goods, if they difier in theh idtial  capital holdings they
will  in general rlot have identical preferences  over the number of immigrants to admit.  We let p,  denote the
distribution  of initial  capital in the native population with  support over some  set rc c  R+.  The size of the
resident  population  is normalized  to one,  so tlLat  IKh(dA1):1.
Once the number of immigrants to be admitt€d has been decided, natives ma&e  their consumption and
saving decisions. In  the second period, the irnmigrants arrir,e, production  tal<es  place, and agents receive
their second-period  incomes,  which they will  divide between second-period  coDsumption  and savings  for the
third peiod.
Pzior  to this second consurrrption-savings  decision, however, agents vote on the size of the income tax
rate 0 to be implemented in  the subsequmt period.i2  Given gor,ernment budget balance snd equilibrium
consideratioru, the choice of g implies a choice of trar$fer  z.  If  immigrants a.re  enfranchised,  then the set
of participants in  this second  round of voting consists of atl 1 + ,'l,f agents irr the economy; otherwise, the
set of paxticipants is the same  as in the fust round of voting-i-e.,  the native population.  Since there is no
uncertainty the walues  of r and d are hown  at the beginrdDg  of period two- As will  be seeu,  these  parameters
are endogenously  determined as functions of other structural  features of the economy.  in a mallner that  we
describe in the next section.
3.2  The model from  period  two  on
In order to describe  the economy's  equilibrium, we work backwa.rds  from the fi.al  period to the first.  Because
of the economy's  recursive structure, we are able to sohc for the eqfibrium  outcome in the last period-in
terms of prices, quantities, a.nd  fiscal polcy  variables---<onditional on a value of M  and a distribution  of
income at the start of the second  period. trhll equilibrium for a gir.en  mlue of M--described  in the subsequent
section-is  then had by stepping back to period one to consider the economic  decisions  which determine the
distribution  of income in the second  oeriod.
roFor exarrple,  by verifying Plott's I1?]  condition.
rr It is also  worth Pointing out that,,  €ven  if one  wished  to consider  altemative political mechanisms  by which policies  sre s€i,
we believe that  much ofour  analysis is still  useful. Clearly,  an esscntial datarn to alry politico-economic  snslysis of immigration
policy  is a descdption  of ratives'  preferences over iBlrigratio[.  A  large  part  of the  analysis  below is siEply  an attrempr ro
understand,  ftom  general equilibrium  considerations, whete lratii,es'  preferences over immigration  colne from.
12  More precisely!  in terms ofthe undetlyitrg  two-party competition,  there is a second  round of elections  in whici the caudrdates
espouse  platforms with l$pect  to 0.In this section, then, we corxider a model where irunigrants,  having a.rrived,  vote together with residmts
over redistributive  fiscal policy at the beginning of period two.  The size of the population or workforce for
these two periods 'E L :  7 + M,  where M  is taken as giren.
Consider a,rr  individual,  who may be either an immigrant  or a native agent, who has income in period
two equal to 92. Such s,rr  individual  faces  the followirg optimization  problem
max  {log(cz)  + ploC(ca)}
subject to ihe budget constraints given by
c2+s3:!J2,
aud
ca  :  (1 -  0) (r3s3  + ru3)  *  z.





where @  :  I-z  + r/  (t  -  e)I /r".  Moreover, substitution of the decision rule and constraints into the agent's
utility  firnction  gives a.n ercpression  for the agent's maximized utility  ftom  period two on in  terrns of the
agetrt's income, 92, the after-tax return  to saving, (1 -  9) 13, and iD-
(t + f) loe  (vz  + o) + f loe  [(1  - d)  r:] . (e)
If  p2 (.)  denotes the  distribution  of  period-two  income  across all  agents in  the  economy  (i-e.  new  rmmr-









where 92 denotes  the average  level of period-two income. Aggregate capital for period three, I{3, is thm  the
sum of Kfl  and Kf,  where the latter is givm  by equation (2), i.e.,
x{:x{  +s-t(B(-o)rs-1).  (11)
We  assume that  the  government  rebates  all  proceeds from  the  period-three  income  tax  to  ageuts in  the
ecotrouy  via  the  transfer  payment  z, which  is identical  across agents.  Thus,
10
(12)With  our  Cobb-Douglas  tecbrology,  the  wage-rental  ratio  is given  by
w3  [t-"]  fft
E:L  "  JT'
Using this, a.nd  the previous expression  for 7, a little  algebra rcveaJs  that
-  [r-a(r-il1  Kt - 
[  o(1  -0)  J L'
Substituting  (f3) into (10),  z  dry:aA(K3/.1)"-1  into (11),  the relationship  I<s:  Kg+Kf  becoEres
a.n  equation that  determires a ruique  r.ralue  of .f(3 for each  value of d e [0,  1], given the wlues of L, K{  aad
the period-two income distributiou  pr.13 Using this implicit  relationship between 0 and K3, the ec<pression
giving the equilibrium return 13  iu terms of K3, and the relationship (13), giving O in terms of I  aad K3, we
ca.n  elaluate €ach agent's indirect utility  for periods two a.nd  three as a frrrrction of the tax rate 0 to find that
agent's preferred tax rat€.  In other words, the preferred tax rate for an individual  with  period-two income
equal to 92 solves:
,ffir  {(1  + B)  loe  (sz  + o)  + f loe  [(r  - a)  rs]] (14)
subject  to (10), (11) and (13),  a.rrd  the conditions  &  :  K{  + KP  a;lLd  n  :  eA(Kz/  L)d-l  .
For the economy  we consider here, agents' implied prefermces over d are well-behaved;  numerical evalu-
ation reveals them to be single'peaked, with  preferred lalues of d wea^kly  decreasing  in the agent's income
gr2-that  is, agetrts with  higher period-tro  incomes prefur lower va.lues  of the tax rate-  As we show in the
appendix, sectioq 6.2 below, in the special case  where there is no foreign capital arrd the third-period  prc
duction tecbnology is linear in capital (i.e. a :  1), one can actually obtain a simple cloced-form solution for
a.ny  agent's preferred tax rate.
Since the couditions of the median voter theorem apply, we set the equilibrium  third-period  tsx  rate
equal to the preferred ralue of the agent with  the median level of period-two income.l4  This implies that
the behavior of the economy in  period three-equilibrium  prices a.nd  qua,ntities and fiscal policy----ca,a  be
described in terms of three variables, the mean and media.n  of the period-two income distribution  a"nd  the
level of irn"nigration.  Moreoler,  the utility  from period two onwa,rd  of any agent ca,:r  be described  in terms
of those  thee variables,  together  with the agent's  or.r pedod-two  income.  Let u(y2;y2,gi,ll4)  denote  this
indirect utility  firnction for an agent who has period-two income equal to U2. Herc, gfl  denotes the median
Ievel of period-two income. This u is simply the indirect utility  frrnction (9), with  iD, 0 a,rrd  13 set equal to
their equilibrium walues,  which in turn  depend on the list of aggregate  statistics ?2, yi  alld,  M.
(13)
13In fact, given the linea  ty of egents' savings  rulee, l("D depende  on the distribution p2 only through its mean, 92. L€ss
ditectly, I{,  as gir.en  in (11), depends  on p2 only through &  as well-there  is a one-tcone relationship between  If  and gp.
raThis is for the benchmarh  case  where all agents  are eaftanchised  in period two. If, on the other hand, immigrants are not
permitted to vote, I'te set the tax rate to the vslu€ preferred  by the native with the medisn levcl of peiod  two income  among
natives. Becsuse  of the motrotonicity in current i[come of age[ts' next-period savings  ilr this ecooomy,  this ildividual  till
simply be the native with the median level of initial cspital.
113.3  The fuIl  three-period  model with  redistributive  taxation
In the last section we have described  the optimization problem faced  by immigrants and natives over the Iast
two periods for given lerrels  of period-two income, and the resulting eqtilibri"m  for a givm  distribution  of
period-two income a.nd  ler.rcl  of immigration.  We now step bark to period one and show how the distribution
of income in  period  two can be determined, giren the lerel of irnmigration  M.  In  the end, we will  have
described the full  equilibrium  of the economy for a giren value of ,'lf.  Using that  information, we can then
turn  to consider natives' Iifetime utilities  ir  terms of M.
First,  note that  the period-two income of a native agent is the sr.un  of capital a^nd  labor incoue, and can
therelore be written  as
A2:r2s2+uz- (15)
For an imiglant,  either 3r2  :  u2 or y2 :  rzkM  *'ruz,  depmding  on whether or tot  immigrants  a,rrire with
some capital,
The  aggregate  stock  of  capital  in  period  two  will  be the  sum of  aggregate  domestic  savings from  period
one,  foreign  capital  located  in  the  domestic  economy  and,  possibly,  capital  brought  by  immigrants.  The
latter,  when  present,  is  simply  given  by  MkM,  if  M  immigra.nts  axe admitted  and  each owns ftM  units  of
capital-  Foreign  capital  employed  in the  domestic  economy in period  two  is gir"en by the  i  :2  version  of (2),
K{=K{+}@"2-r).
The interesting problem is again faced by natives, who must make a consumption-sa.vings  decision in
period one, given the level of immigration  M  and expectations about the distribution  of income which will
prevail in period two. We may cast a typical native's decision problern as
max  log  (h1  -  s2)  + Ba  (r2s2  + uz;az,AT,  M) .
Given the form  of the indircct  utility  fi.rrction o-it  is logaritbmic  in  y2 + iD-utility  maximization  again
gives rise to a savings  rule which is Iinear ir  income- In pa.rticular,
s2  (h1;  w2,r2,y2,yi,  M)  :
L+  BG+  B)
where  O is as defined  in  (13), eraluated  at  the  period-three  capital  stock  a.nd tax  rate  implied  b,y iz,Af  ,M-
This  theu  gir€s  ag$egate  domestic  saving----equivalently,  domestically-owned  capital  in  place  for  period
two-as
Ki:  I  s2  (\;u2,r2,s2,s{, M) p1@.k1)
JK
-B(r+ E)h  - (toz+a)  lrz
L+t3(1+B)
(16) P(L+0h-(w+o)lr2
(17)where k1 is the ar€rage initial  capital holding among natives.
Aggregate capital in period two is then K2 :  KP  + K{  *  Kjw,  where K{  :  Ml"M  ia the case  where
immigrants each bring  frM >  0 units  of capital-  In  either case, by substitut iutg w2 :  (l  -  a) A (K2 / L)"
a.nd  12:  aA(K2/L)'-L  into the previous  expressioas  for K2D  aud Kf,  the equilibrium condition K2 :
Kl  + K{  + Ky  beccimes  dn equatiori .rhich can be solved for K2 given tr and O. This is the capital stock
il  period two for a given lerel of immigration  (embodied in -L) and a given distribution  of period-t$'o income
(captured  in @).
For a given ralue of M,  then, the first-period  savings  decision of natives depends  on a conjecture about
the  period-two  distribution  of income, since this  determines the outcome in  period tbree.  Clearly, the
natires'  decisions  m  hnply a distribution  of income in  period tpo.  The economy is in equilibrium  when
the  conjectured and realized distributions  coincide.  More precisely, the  conditiom  that  chaxa.cterrze  an
eqfibrium  for this economy  in our benchma,rk  case  can be summarized as follows.
Given the following  initial conditions  for the fust period, p1  (.),K{,L,  an equilibrium is then a list
IKilK?,K{,Ky,wa,ra,yf  ,U2,0,r}, for  I :  1,2,  and  a distribution  of  capital  pr2  (.), such  that the  fotlow-
ing conditions hold:
1. Agents' consumptiotr-savings  decisions  follow the rules (8) and (16).
2- Factor prices for each period.  are given by equations (3) and (  ).
3. The capital stocks  obey  Kz:  KP + Kf  + Ky  afi. h:  K{  + K{,  where  KuF  follows  (2) and I{iD,
for i.  :7,7,  is given  by (tZ) and (t0).
4. The initial  distribution  of initial  capital p1  , together I'ith  the decision  rule (  16) and the second-period
factor prices w2 and,  rz, induces a distribution  of lncome in period two given by pr, with  mean 92 and
median yf-
5. The tax rate d solves  the problem (74) for y2:  gf.  Also, the lump sum transfer is determined by
equation  (12).
6. The variable  Q in equations  (8), (10), (14), (16) and (17)  is as  defined  in (13).
Having described  how the economy's  equi.librium is constructed for a paxticular given va.lue  of L :  l*  M,
we will now turn to study the preferences  of native agents  over different le\.€ls  of immigration.  By substituting
equilibrirrrn prices, taxes and transfers at each  ralue of M,  together with  agents' optimal decision  rules, back
into the ageuts' lifetime  utility  firnctions, we can study how an individual's  iifetime  utility  over all three
periods ranies as a futction  of the level of immigration,  M.
The actual construction of arr equfibrium  is somewhat  involved, as one might gather from the discussion
above. This is due to the depeudence  of the third-period  outcome-including  the gor.ernmeut  policy va.riables
13d and r----on the endogenous  distribution  of income in the second  period, which in turn  conditioDs agents'
decisions  in the first period. In equilibrium, prices and quantities must be such  that the optimal choices  which
individual  agerts make at larious dates are consistmt y,rith the Laws  of motion of the aggregate  'rariables.
Because  ofthe model's complocity, analytical results axe  difrcult  to obtain outside ofa few special  cases-
e.9., the case  of perfect capital mobiliiy,  which we examine below. Consequently,  in the following sectiou we
report the results from numerical simulations of the model, under alternatia€ assumptious  about the degrees
of initial  income inequality and capital mobiliiy,  as well as under alternative assumptions  about the wealth,
enftanchisement and entitlements of the immigrant  populaiion-  The precise method which we employ for
actually  computing an equilibrium  is detailed in a technical appendix, which is available ftom the authors
upon request.ls
4  Some  numerical  exannples
4,1  Results for a benchmark  case
We initia.lly  abstract from internationa.l capital movements (setting )  :  *m  and Kf  :  0) and consider  an
economy in which immigrants, if admitted, a.rrive  with  only labor to supply, a.re  enfranchised  to vote in the
second  period over the economy's  redistributive  tax policy and a,re  recipients of the lumpsum  trausfer.
Throughout all of our erramples,  the model's basic taste and technology paxarnet€rs  are set in the following
way. The parameter o, capital's share of output,  is set equal to 0.30. The common discount factor B is set
equal to 0.95.16 Finally,  the technolory's scale pararneter A  is set to yield a 10% return  to capital in the
middle period, absent any immigration  arrd subsequmt taxatiotr.
We also assume  throughout that natives' initial  capital holding" (frr) hare a log-normal distribution  which
is tra.nslated away from the origin to guara.rntee  that  all natives begiu with some  arnount of capital. We limit
our attetrtiotr here to log-normal distributions,  as these seem  to provide a reasonable  approximation to ob.
sen€d distributions of wealth while retaining substantial computatioral  tractability.  For all our er<periments,
we fix the average  initial  capital holding at  l0  u:rits a.nd  the midmum  initial  capital holding at 2 units of
capital-  For our benchma.rk  case,  the rralia.nce  of the distribution  is set to gil€  a Gini coefficient of rougbly
0.37, which is close  to measures  of the Gini coeff.cieut for the distribution  of income in the US.17
Figure  1 summarizes some of the resr-rlts  for  this  economy as the level of imrnigration  is lanied from
M  :0  to M  :  .25. The level of i:nmigration  M  is the rariable  on the horizontal axis in all the panels  of
Figure 1, as well as in the subsequent  plots of the model's output.  Since the size of the native population
lsThe  numerical examples  we present below were computed tsing  programs qrritten for MATLAB. The progrsms are slso
available on request.
l6Els€where 
[9] we have studied the influence  which the preference  and production psraneters p  aud a  caa have on tbe
prefered level of immigration.
r? We harr  alao examired  models with  e number  of different  dist  butions  for rativ€s'  irdtial  wealth.  (See {9]).
14is norma.lized  to  one, lalues  of  M  are s,'non''mous  with  numbers  of  immigrants  as a ftaction  of  the  native
population-
Pa,nel A  shows the  behavior  of third-period  tax  rate  as we vary  M.  For  this  economy, the  tax  rate  rises
smoothly  as the  number  of immigrants  a.dmitted  increases.  If  the  figure  were extended  rightward,  the  tar
rate  wor-rld eveutually  rise  to  e maximum  of  roughly  31%.  While  it  is  perhaps  intuitir,e  that  the  addition
of  agents  who  are both  poor  and  permitted  to  vote  should  lead  to  higher  redistributive  taxation,  this  is
not  inevitable  and  depends  to  a large  extent  on the  shape of  the  initial  distribution  of capital.  As  we show
below,  for  log-normal  distributions  of  initial  capital  vrith  low  degrees of  inequality,  it  is  possible  for  the
equilibrium  tax  rate  to  fa.ll as immigrants  are added to  the  ecoromy-even  falling  to  zero-despite  the  fact
that  imrrigrants  are poorcr  thaJx the  ar,erage native  and  enfrarchised  to  vote.
The  ecplanation  for  the  behavior  of the  tax  rate  itl  the  case at  hand  lies in  the  plot  irn:nediaiely  below,
Panel  C. Panel  C shoq,s the behavior  of three  different  income  measrues in the  second period-  The  va.riables
relere.nt  for  the  det€rmination  of the  taJC  rate  ale  med,ian second-period  income  and  aueru4e second-period
income.  Rccall  that  when all  agents-both  natives  a"nd  immigrants-are  allowed  to vote oa€r tax  policy,  then
in  equilibrium  the  third-period  tax  rate  is set at  the  walue preferred  by  the  individual  with  the  median  level
of income  in  period  tro-  Ilowever,  as in  other  political-ecouomic  models  of redistribution,  the  actual  value
of the  tax  chosen by the  media.n income  recipient  depends on th€  ratio  of that  individual's  income  to  a'uerage
income.rE  As immigrants  are added to  this  economy, each immigrant  coming  with  only  labor  to  supply,  both
median  and arerage second-period  income fall,  and in this  case media.n second-period  income falls faster  than
ar'erage second-period  inmme.  Consequeutly,  the  gap  between  median  and  average secoud-period  income
$ows,  rcsulting  in  a,rt  itrcreasing  tsx  rate.
With  a log-normal  distribution  of initial  capital  and  very  low  i::itia.l  wealth  inequality,  it  is possible  for
median  second-period  income  to  fall  more  slotulg than  arerage  second-period  income,  resr.rlting in  tax  rates
which  decline  with  the  mrmber  of irnmigrants.  In  some cases, the  tax  rate  may  then  begin  to  rise after  the
level  of immigration  reaches a critical  level; in  other  cases, the  tax  rate  can actually  fall  to  zero and  remaia
there  until  immigrants  outnumber  natives-lg
The behavior  of fartor  prices-the  returns  to labor  and capital  in  periods  two  and three----ca.n  be deduced
from  Psnel  E,  which  plots  the  capital-labor  ratios  in  each of  the  tq,'o periods,  as functions  of  the  level  of
immigration.  In  both  period  two  and  period  three,  the  capital-labor  ratio  falls  as M  is increased.  The
18This  feature is common to a number of different economies  (See  PeNson  aDd  Tabellini [f6]). See  Dolmas  and lIufiman  [10]
for e derivation of thfu featurc in s much more epecialized  environment.
lgThis is api to happen ss well when the distributioo of initial capital holdings is coDrposed  of a flnite number  of types {e.9-,
tiro  typ€s of native-sr rich  rrBtives with  capital  'i'  and poor natives vrith  capitat  &P), or il  there is a large mass of natives who
hold  the  media,tr quantity.  What  all  thcse cases heve in  common  tu thst  a lsrge  influx  of immigrants  leads to  only  a small
decrease,  ot no decresse  st all, in the initial capital holdiDg  which identifies the median ageDt  in period two.
LOdeclines,  though, a.re  less  than proportioual  to the increases  in M-aggregat€  savings  in both periods (hence
the capital stocks K2 and K3)  a.re  rising with  M,  but  not by eno'rgh to meintain the original capital-labor
ratios in  the two periods.  With  our  Cobb-.Douglas  technology, this leads to  higher ma.rginal products of
capital and lowel marginal products of labor in each of the two periods. Thus, as M  increases  both 12 and
13 rise, while u2 arld @3  fall.
The lifetime utilities  of some  representative  natives in this economy  are shown  in Pa^nels  B, D and F along
the right side of the Figure. Panel B shows  the utility  of the poorest native, which declines  moaotonicdly  as
M  increases.  Poorer uatives rely more heavily on their labor income, and consequently  suffer as irnmigration
drives down the returrs  to labor in periods two and three. Evm thougb the tax rate-and  associated  transfer
payment-are  increasing with  M,  this increased  redistribrtion  is not sufficient to outweigh the loss  in poorer
natives' wages. By contrast, the utility  of a relatil€Iy  wealthy native, showa in Panel F, rises monotonically
with  M  in this case,  in spite of the higher tax rate.  The wealthy native here is mdowed with  the level of
initial  wealth which defines  the top 1% percent of the initial  wealth distribution.  The relatively rich agents
prefer higher levels of immigration  because  it  raises the marginal product  of capital,  and therefore raises
their capital income.
The preferences  of the media.n  native-the  native with  the media.n  holdiag of initial  capital-are  shown
ir  Panel D. For this  distribution  of initial  wealth, the media.n  uative is poorer thaJr average,  though not
greatly so-the  median native's initial  capital  holding is about 68% of the al€rage initial  capital holrling.
Still, the median is relia"nt on labor income to a suficient  fitent  that his or her utility  falls as M  increases.
Were the figure extended rightwa.rd, though, this decline would begin to 'bottom  out'  a,round  M  :  .50, or
au influx  of immigrants equal to 50% the size of the native population.  Nonetheless,  over the interval 0 to
.25,  the media.n's  preferred  1"ysl  6f lmmigration is zero.20
Note, too) that while the median natire's lifetime utility  is falling, his or her second-period  income*-shor rr
in Panel C-is  rising. The sa.me  is true of the median uative's third-period  income as well. As the iaflow of
immigrants reduces  the value of the natire's labor endowrnent  and increases  the return to saving, this native
sal€s more for the future-arrd  consumes  less in the first  period-than  he or she would have chosen  to in
the absence  of immigration.  This example illustrates why it would be inappropriate to mea.sure  the effect of
immigration  on the native population merely by how their incomes  drange--particula.rly  their labor income.
20A generel feeture of th€ closed version of the economy studied here is that  so long as s nstile  is eadowed with  sorDe  amount
of capital, howe!.er  small, there is a level of immigratio[,  sufrciently large,  which thst  native will prefer to zero iDrmigration.
If a large enough  quantity of complementsry labor is added to the economy,  the increase  in the value of even s poor trative's
cspitAl will eventually ofiset the decline  iD the value of that nsiive's labor eDdowment.  RealGtically,  though, before  that poi[t
is reached  there ar€ other cons€quences  to imDrigration-e.g.,  coDgestion  efiects  o!'cultlllsl'  effect3  which would coEre  itrto
play and are not present itr our model- Our upper bound of M  :  .25  is already at the edge  of historical experience  for almost
all countries.
10Within  the conten:'t  of such a d]'narnic environment, to calculate the true impact on welfare, it  is important
to meaaure  hov,r  both factor prices and agent's decision rules cha.nge  in response  to the immigration,
In this exa,mple  all agents  prefer either the maximum or minimum allowable level of immigration,  with
a majority-those  at or below the median lerel of initial  capital-preferring  zero immigration.  This 'pola.r-
ization' of natives' preferences  is a result a.lso  found by Benlabib  [4j in studying this same  issue. Howeler,
there axe  othe.r  examples  of the present model in which ma.ny  agent's prefermces are single-pealced  orer an
interyef f0, t4,  with interior maxima over that  intenrl.  However,  in some  of these  instances  it helps to have
e rather  large  upper  bound  on the  level  of immigration.
4,2  The effect of changing inequality
The two panels of Figrue 2 illustrate  how the behavior of the benchmark emnomy changes  as we vary the
degree of inequality  in  the iaitial  distribution  of ca.pital aroong natives.  Panel A  shows the  behavior of
th€ tax rate for four different degrees  of initial  wealth inequality, as measured by the distributions'  Gini
coeftcients.2r The diflerent degrees  of initial  wealth inequality affect both the lerrl  of the tax rate at zero
immigration  and the behavior of the tax rat€ for positive values of immigration-  The tax rate corresponding
to  a Gini  coeftcient of 0.37 simply  replicates the  benchma.rk  case shown in  Panel A  of Figure  l.-  For a
lower degree  of initial  wealth inequality-a  Gini of 0.251-the tax rate at zero immigration is roughly half its
correspondilg value in the benchma"rk  economy. With  lower initial  wealth inequality, the resulting degree  of
iuequality in second-pe.riod  incomes  is also lower, hence  the gap between  media.n  and average  second-period
incomes  smaller, and so the impetus for redistribution  tempered. As in the benchma.rk  case,  the tax rate in
the 0.25-Gini  ecouomy rises with  the lel€l  of immigration,  though more slowly. At  a more extreme degree
of low inequality-a  Gini of 0.10-ihe  tax  rate actually  decli,rns  as imruigrants a.re  added to the economy,
falling quickly to zero near M  :  -lO- In this case,  arerage ilcome  in period two initially  falls more sharply
with  the increase in  M  than median income in  pedod two, to  the poi:rt where-near  M  =  .10-a\,'erage
income falls belovr median income, and the period-tno  medisJr  voter prefers a zero tax rate.
With  a higher degree  of inequality the tax rate is high because  the relativek  poor median roters in period
two aote to e)dract income ftom the richer agents,  irrespective of the size  of the immigrad  population.  With
enough initial  wealth inequaiity-in  this  case a Gini  coefficient of 0.50-the  median of the initial  capital
distribution  is so far below the mean that  natives at or beloy/ the media.n  do not have positive savings for
period two, so the median roter  over tax poliry  is an agent with  only labor income rega.rdless  ofthe  level of
irnrnigtation.  The preferred income tax rate for such an individuat is roughly 31%.22
2r  In these  experiments,  we hold constsnt the meen initial cspital holding and the midmum  initial capital holditrg
22In this  case, at  all  lBlues of  M  the  rstio  of  median  to  sverage second-period  income is simply  labor'6  share of  trational
income, or 1 -  o.  In this case,  raisiDg  the ta"x  rate even higher does  not rabe the wage  of labor in the ldst pcriod because  it
deters  investment  in caDitsl-
L7Pa^nel B  of  Figure  2 illustrates  how  the  preferences  of  the  media.n native  cha.nge as the  degree of initial
wealth  inequality  rhanges.  Since we a,re holding  fixed  average initial  capital,  the  initial  capital  level  held by
the  media.n native  fa.lls as the  degree of  irequality  increases.  Consequently,  to  facilitate  compa,rability  we
have norma.lized  the  median  natir"e's  utility  by  a constant  so that  the  media.n's utility  in  each case is  zero
at  zero  immigration.  The  important  feature  of  Panel  B  is  that,  as the  degree of  iaitial  wealth  iaequality
'ranies from  high  inequa"lity  to  low  inequality,  the  median  native's  distaste  for  immigration  lessens, and  is
irr  fact  rer"ersed-when  the  initial  wea.lth  distribution  is  characterized  by  a  Gini  coefrcient  of  0.10,  the
median  natire  prefers  the  maximum  level  of  immigration  to  zero  irnmigration.2s  Since  any  natire  with
initial  capital  at  l€ast  es great  as the  media^n a.lso prefers  M  --  .25 to  M  :  0,  at  least  50% of  the  natives
in  the  low-iuequality  economy prefer  the maximum  level of irnmigration.  If  we compa.re the  behavior  of this
Iow-inequality  economy with  the  otherwise  ideqtical  beuchmark  economy, the  two will  have sharply  different
politieeconomic  equilibria-M  :  0 and a roughly  21% tax  rate  in the  bencbmark  economy  uersus M  :  .25
a,nd a zero tax  rate  in  the  low-inequality  economy.
The  basic  mecha"niem at  work  here is the  following.  For  a fixed  average initial  endowment  of  capital,  a
higher  degree of inequality  translates  into  a lower  median  level  of  initial  capital,  relative  to  arerage.  This
has the  efiect  of making  the nedian  native  more  reliant  or  his or her labor  income  in periods  two  and tb.ree,
hence mote  averse to  iumigration.  The  opposite  is true  as the  de$ee  of inequality  is reduced.2a
Ceteris  paribus,  then,  we would  expect economies with  lower degrees of wealth  inequality  to be more open
to  ineigration.  Some evidence in  faror  of this  result  is shoq/:r in  Figure  3, which  illustrates  the  relationship
between  the  quantity  of loug term  immigration,  as a fraction  of total  population,  and  the  level of inequality,
as measured  by the  Gini  coefrcient.2s  There  is a significant  Degative correlatiou  betweeu  these two r,ariables,
as predicted  by  the  model.26
t3The  sarne patter[  arises if  we instead  hold  fixed  ihe  median  level of initial  weslth  aDd allorr  the  mean to  change as the
degree  of incquality changes.
24It is worth noting that  there js nothing special  in this example atlout the los-normal distribution of iritisl  cspitat- The
effects which  chsnges in  inequaliiy  can have on the  rcsults  are robust  to  sll  distdbutions  that  we have snslyzed,  See Dol$as
and llutrman  [9].
25The Gini coelficients  are derived  from a data set published  by the World BaDk. The data on long term immigrants is hom
the United Nations [19]. We look at long term imDrigrants  to avoid other florr/s  such as tourists. Obviously these  must then be
normalized  by population  to sdjust  for country  size.
26This relstionship would be ev€n  tighter if Australia were  excluded. It  is an apparent outlier for interesting  reasona.  During
Australia's gold rush, the Immigratiod Rest  ction act of 1901  was enacted  which excluded  non-European  immigration.  This
act was not repealed  until  1971,  and since  thelr they have  been  makiEg up for lost time, since  over 50% of current immigrantg
ariving  in AustElia  are from Asia (see  Maltin  [14]). Parentheticauy,  Canada's  historical poiicieg  have rot  been  sulxtautially
difierent: Until  1967,  99% of all Censdisn immigrsnts were of European origin- Howerer, by the year 2000  it  is expected  that
18%  of a  Cadadians  will be 'visible minorities'.
184.3  The effects of capital  mobility
In this section, we examine the consequences  which international  capital mobiliff  can harre  for the behavior
of this economy.
4.3.1  Perfect  capital  motrility
The model is suficiently  rich that it  is difficult  to obtain many conclusive  a.nalltic results. One enception is
the case  where there is perfect capital mobfity,  the case  where the adjustmetri cost paxameter .tr  is equal to
zero. The results can be summa,rized  by the following proposition:
Proposition  L Il  A:0,  then 0 :0,  and this is the preferyed  ta.x  mte of all citizetu aoting  in the serond
period,. We then hate that 12 :  rt  -  !/F  and w2 :  ta3 :  (1 -  a)A(aBA)ria,  all ind.epend,ent  oJ  M.
Consequently,  aII iwitial  natiues are ind,ifierent about the leael of imrnzgtntion.
Proof.  See  the Appendix.
This  result holds independent of the tratue  of the  initial  distribution  of capita^I,  and indepeudent of
th€ parameter rslues used for prefereuces  a,rrd  techrology.  The reason for this is fairly  intuitive.  With  no
adjustment cost, the supply of foreign physical capital is perfectly elastic at the time preference  rate 1/8,  so
equilibrium  demands that  12 and (1 -  d)r3  eqaf  1/8.  With  ihe after-tax  return to capital in period-three
thus fixed, labor bea.rs  the full incidence  of any tax imposed, and so, in a sense,  redistribution  is pointless. All
agents  thus prefer  0:0,  implying r:0  as  well. With 12  :7r  :  1/F and our constant-returns  technology,
the capital-labor ra.tios in  periods two and three are fxed  independent of M,  as a,re  the returns to labor
ra2 and ra3.  Since immigants  then impose no msts on rcsidents-nor  do they  confer any benefits-the
ecoromy's natir€s  are indifrerent about the lei,el of irnmigration.  In  this  case, iu  effect, each additional
immigrant  is accompanied  by precisely enough physical capital to 'correct'  the depressing  effect which the
immigrant  has oa natir"e wages  and the positive effect which the imrnigra.nt has on the return  to capital.
Presumably this result u,ould change  if there were some  direct costs to immigration  (e.9. congestlon  costs  or
perhaps admidstrati!€  costs  associated  with processing  the uew immigrants) wbich were borne by the initial
residents. The result would a.lso  change  if the production  tech.nology  w€re not constant-returns-to-scale  in
capital and labor, or if a nou-reproducible factor such a,s  lend werc present.
4.3.2  Limited  capital  mobility
What happens  when there is less-tha.n-perfect  capital mobility?  In this section, we compare  the results from
our benchmark case  where capital is immobile ()  =  +m)  with  results for economies  with  some degree  of
capital mobility-  For the cases  with some  degree  of mobility  we consider .\ :  0.10 ard  .\ :  0.05.27  Although
27We  experimettcd with .vlurious  .v?lues  of I.  It turns out that the behavior of this eco[omy for values  of .\ as  low as I:  0.20
is quite clos€  to the behsvior of the ecoEomy  with no c$pital mobility at all (l  :  +oo).
19we will  not illu,strate this in detail, as .\ approaches  zero, all the results approach the ones described above
for the case  of perfect capital mobility.
Figure 4 illustrates the effects  of alternatire  levels  of capital mobility.  Panel A shows  the behavior of the
third-period  tax rate, which both declines  at each  ralue of M  as capital mobility  increases  and becomes  less
responsil€ to charxged  in 'M the greater'degree of capital mobility.  Of course, the tax rate must ultimately
fa]l to z€ro at all r'alues  of M  as )  ---+  0.
In  general, the  effect of capital  mobility  on the  equilibrium  tax  rate  is comploc-i-n  particular,  the
presenc€  of foreign physical capital  complica.tes  the dhect liuk  betwem the level of the tax  rate and the
ratio of second-period  rnedia.u  to average  income which obtains in the closed economy case. The effects of
changing the degree  of capital mobility  are occasionally non-monotonic as v€ll.  In a number of economies
we e:<a.rnined,  as we increased the degee of capital mobitity  (i.e., lowered the mlue  of ,\ from  A :  *oo),
economies  which started with very low tax rates over the interval of M-rnlues experienced-idtially-higher
ta)<  rates at som€  or all values of M,  before the taxes €ventually fell again.
The preferences  of the median voter over the level of immigration,  shovu in Panel B of the figu-re,  arc
always decreasing  ir  the level of immigration.  Hoqever, they a,re  decreasing  much less sharply the geater
the degree of foreign capital mobility-i.  e-, the smaller is ,\.  This is what  one would expect, given that
in the limit,  as )  -+ Q, we must approach indifference over the lalue  of M  for all natives in the economy.
In other words, the median native dislikes irnmigration,  but  the effects of immigration  can be arneliorated
subsiantially by the importation  of capital.
This result suggests  that goa€rnments  may be able to curtail opposition to immigration  by also adopiing
policies to  attract  capital.  In  our model economy,  the capitallabor  ratios in both  production  periods, at
eaclr ler"el  of M,  are higher with  greater capital mobility  tha"n  with  less mobility.  Consequently,  the effects
of immigration  on factor prices are less pronouaced the greatex  the de$ee of capital mobility.  As a rcsult,
capital-poor uatives suffer less ftom  i:nmigration  when thexe is greater international  mobility  of physical
capital.2s
Our model would imply that if capital were  mobile, then countries that were to have plenty of immigration
v/ou-ld  also be importing  capital.  We have found a significant positive correlation  betn'een the size of a
country's foreign-bom  population,  and the  level of net foreign direct  in'estment.  Additionally,  there is
ample anecdotal evidence  on this poini.  Until  recentlg the economi€s  of both Singapore and Malaysia had
been growing at approrcimately 9% per year for a sustained period of time,  primarily  by importing  la,rge
quantities of both labor a.nd  capital.2e Ma,rtin [14] states that  in the early 1990s  nea;rly 7% of the GDP in
Malaysia was attributable  to foreign direct investment. Our oru  calculatioff] reveal arr even higher mrmber
28Though,  of course,  capital-rich natives beDefit  less  from immigration as well.
29See  Martin  I14]. As much as  70% of the jobs iD the construetion  sector  in Malaysia ai€ taken up by foreign workers.
20for  Singapore in  tle  1980s. tr\rthermore,  it  is well-knovrn that  there have been large amounts of both
Asian capital a,nd  labor imported  into the Vancouver region of Ca.nada  over the past 10-15 years, with  a
concomitant esca,lation  in real estate prices.
4.4  Alternative  assumptions  on  irnmigrants'  voting  rights,  endowments  and
entitlements
In the experiments of this section, we consider the effects  of different assumptions  about immigrants' voting
rights, their wealth or poverty upon arriviug,  aud their entitlement to govemmeDt  transfer payments. Each
of these  cases  has some  relevance  from an empirical public policy standpoint. In most coutrtries, 'r'oting righk
axe grarted  to irnYnigrants  only as the culmination  of a lengthy process  of naturalization.  Sone cormtries
as well have adopted policies which attempt  to  alter the compo€ition of their  Lnmigant  in-flows  in ways
which favor inmigrarts  y'ith  lsrge a,rnolurts  of capital.s0 Finally, the view that irnmigrants represent  a drain
on public services  such as welfare and education, and perhaps ought to be excluded from these services,  is
prelzlent  ia policy debates  orer immigration  both in the US aud elsewhere.
In earh of the er<anples  below, we report two sets  of resu.lts,  one for the closed-ecoromy  case  of no capital
mobility  (.\:  +co)  ad  one for  the case of limited  capital  mobility  ()  =.10).  The resu.lts for  all of the
experiments arc contained in the panels of Figure 5.
4.4.1  Disenfranchised  immigrants
First of all, we compare  the behavior of our benchma,rk  economy  to one  in which ifirmigra[ts  axe  not permitted
to vote over fiscal policy, but  still  pay the tax a.ud  receive the tra.::sfer  r.  The key feature of this regime is
that the median voter over tax policy in period two is the median native rega.rdless  of the level of imnigration
allowed ln period one.
The top two panels  of Figure 5 show the behavior of the third-period  tax rate and the preferences  of the
median native when the economy  is closed  to foreign capitaf (.\ :  +oo).  In this case,  as indicated by the 'A'
symbol, when immi$arts  a.re  disenfta.nchised,  the third-period  tax rate fa.Us  as immigants  a.re  added. If
irnmigrfits  are not permitted to vote in the second  period, the population voting wer  ta,:<  policy for period
three consiats  solely of uatives, and the ta,x rate is set according to the preferences  of the natire  with  the
median lerel of initial  capital-  In this case,  the second-period  inmme of the media,n  native is increashg in
ll4 (just as in Panel C of Figure 1), and consequently  this individual would choose  lower tax rates at higher
values  of M.  The effect which disenfranchisement  of imynigrants  has on the median uative's utility  shown in
Panel B, is less  pronounced. Compared to the benchmark case,  the median native's utility  at each  lerel of M
30  E-g.,  the US immigE  ion  legislatiorl  of  1990 c.reated a visa category specificelly  for  investols  who cr€ate jobs.  Howevei,
the nearly 10,000  visss  per year allocated to this preference  category  have  gone  largely unutilized. Figures for this cstegory sre
detailed in the US Immigrstion snd Naturalizstion Seruice's  1996  Statisticel Yearbook 1201.
2ris slightly  higher,  but  this  individual-ard  the  50% of the  nati\,e  population  with  lower  iDitial  endowm€nts
of capital-would  still  opt  for  M  :  0 even if  immigrants  a,re disenfranchised.
In  economies  with  lorrer  degrees of  initial  wealth  inequality,  where  the  mediaJx trati!€  is wealthier,  it  is
possible  for  the  disenftanchisement  of immigra.nts  to  alter  the  equilibrium  immigration  outcome.  When  the
median  native  is  wealthier,  the  coutrteri?iling  factor  price  effects  of  irn:nigration  on  his  or  her  utility  are
more  ofi-setting,  making  the  fiscal  consequences of immigration  more  important.
When  we allow  for  limited  capital  mobility,  the third-period  tax  rate--{hose,n  by the median  native  when
immigrants  a.re disenftanchised-is  no  longer  decreasing  in  M,  but  is  stil1  considerably  lov/er  st  positiv€
values of  M  than  it  would  be were immigra.nts  permitted  to  vote.  The  preferences  of the  mediar  native  in
the  liynited-capital-mobility  case, shown  in  Panel  D,  are e!€n  more  similar  across the  two  enfranchisement
regimes  than  ir  the  closed economy  case shovrn in  Panel  B.  This  is  to  be  orpected,  as inflows  of  foreigt
capital  dampen  the  changes in  factor  prices engmdered  by immigratiou.  As in  the  closed economy  case, the
median  natirc  here  prefers  M  :  0 regardless  of  whether  immigrants  are permitted  or  barred  ftom  voting
over redistribution-
Rega.rdless of  whether  there  is  no  capital  mobility  or  limited  capital  mobility,  the  preference  for  high
immigration  of wealthier  natives  (not  shown)  is significantly  stronger  when  immi$alrts  are not  permitted  to
vote,  du€ to  the  lower  taxes  whidr  result  when  immigrants  are disenfta.nchised.
4.4.2  Wealthy  immigrants
We aow  suppoee that  immigrants,  rather  than  being  endowed with  only  labor  to  supply-hence  coming  in
at  the  bottom  of  the  secoud-period  income  distribution-are  endowed  with  capital  as well.  In  pa.rticula.r,
we consider  a case where  earh  immigrant  a.rrives with  ar  amount  of  capital  which  would  place  the.m at  the
cut-ofi  for  the  top  20% of the  initial  distribution  of capital  among  natires-3r
We fust  consider  the  closed-economy  case. Panel  A  of Figrue  $ qgqin  sh6rr,E  the  behavior  of the  tax  rate
for the ).:  +m  case. Th€ tax rate when immigrants  arrive wealthy is shovrn by the'O'line  in the panel.
R.elatiw  to  the  benchmark  economy  (sho*'n  by  the  'Q'  line),  the  tal< rate  at  all  positive  values  of  M  is
slightly  higher  when  immigrants  axrive with  capital,  and is still  increasing  in  the  Ievel of irnmigration.  When
immigrants  come with  substantial  wealth,  the  initial  capital-holding  identifying  the  second-period  median
voter  uow  nses  with  M.  While  the  increasing  wealth  lerzel a.ud second-period  income  of  the  median  lnotetr
would  seem, other  things  equal,  to  lead to  decreasing tax  rate6,  auerage pe,riod-two  income-whidr  can be
viewed  as a measure of the  ta>c  base-is  increasing  ewn  more sharply-  Hence the equilibrium  tax  rate  is still
increasins  as a function  of  M-
SlThis is especially  inter€sting given the appare[t difierenc€s  in the immigrstion policies of Canada aud the US. The US,
until  very  recently,  seems to  have given litile  consideration  to  th€ skills  or wealth  levels of immigranta,  whereas Cansda giv€3
these factoN  substaniial  weight,  and ha.s  tleen cdticized  for selling citizeDship.
22While the fiscal consequeuces  of immigrants' wea.lth  seem  small, whether immigrants are poor or wealthy
does male  a great deal of difference for  the  preferences  over immigration  of the median native.  When
im.uigrarts  are wealthy  and capital  is  immobile,  the  median native  now prefers the  maximum  level of
immigration.  While we do oot show the preferences  of other agents in the econouy, il'  this case  all natives
poorer than the median also prefer the maximum level of irrnigration,  as immigra"nts  now raise, rather tha,rr
lower, the return  to labor.  Of course, coming with  capital, immigra.nts also lower the return  to capital in
the economy,  which harms the natives at the upper end of the initial  capital distribution.
If  we allow for  lirnited  capital  mobility,  the efiect of immigrants'  wealth on natires'  preferences  does
not  change  much-as  Panel D shows, we still  move ftom s situation  where the median natire  prefers zero
immigration  (when im:nigrants are poor) to one in which the media.n  native prefers the ma>cimurn  level of
immigration  (when immigrants a,re  rich).  The behavior of the tax rate shown in Panel C is quite difrerert
from  what  is shown in  Panel A.  What  is happening here is that  as more wealthy immigra,nts enter the
economy)  this depresses  the rate of rcturn  to capital. Because  capital is mobile, other capital then lsrues the
ecnnory.  The tax rate then is lov.er in this case (compa.red  with  the ):  too  case)  to partially  count€ract
this effect al'd ameliorate the outflow of capital.
4.4.3  Immigrants  without  entitlements
Another experiment that  is of interest is to investigate what happens when i:mmigrants,  who have no initial
capital) catr enter the economy and must pay taxes, but  do not get to vote, and do not get the resulting
transfer (r).  This if of interest since many people seem  to view the problem with  imsigration  to be that
the immigrants will subsequently  become  a drain on public services  such as weLfa,re  or education- The uodel
indicates that  in  this  instance appaxently all initial  residents favor the ma:rimum level immigration.  The
reason  is simple  trativEs now view the immigrants as a tax base that  cam  be exploited and which does not
receive  its shaxe  of the transfer. Because  of this, the residents, despite being relatil€ly  rich, now faror  rnuch
higher leuek of ttnation  so that  they can exploit this immigrant  population.
The tax consequences  of this  modification  are apparent from  Panels A  and C. When immigrants  are
disen-fta.nchised  and barred from receiving the trarsfer,  a.uy  lerrl  of immigration  decided  in period one leads
to shaxply highex taxes as compa.red  with  the benchmark economy. The cases  of no capital roobility  and
limited  capital mobility  a"re  distinguished only by the somewhat lorer  tax rates wtrich obtain wben capital
is mobile-rougbly 35%  whm M  :  .25  n  the ):  .10  case  r€rflxi over  50%  when M  = .25  in the.\:  -l-oo
case.
As Panels  B and D show, the median native has a strong preference  fot M  :  .25 in this case,  regardless
of whether capital is immobile or mobile.  WJriIe we do not report  the prefetences  of other natil'es, we find
that  all natires share the median natiye's preference  in this case-the  poorer natives in spite of the lolver
23wages  which result arrd the pealthier  latives  fur  spite of the higher taxes which result.
5  Final  R  emarks
The model that  we have constructed and studied is unique in that  it  attempts to explore both the general
equilibrium factors that  can influmce an economy's  ilnmigration  policy decision,  as well as the effects  a,rising
from  the interaction  of imrnigration  and the determination  of other domestic policies-in  particula.r, how
the immi$ation  decision will  in-fluence  the futu-re disiribution  of income in the economy,  and therefore how
lhis w1JJ.  infiuence future f,scal policies. The preferences  of natives orer the quantity of immigration talte into
accouat both of these  sets of consequences.  Immigratiotr  in one period will  a"fiect  factor prices in subsequent
periods in ways that  benefit the relatively  capital-rich  a^nd  ha,rm the relatir.ely capital-poor, if immigrants
a.re  themselves  capital-poor,  When immigra,nts a,re  enfranchised to vote over subsequent  fscal  policy, the
model implies that  rati\€s  must ta.ke  into consideration how the lerel of immigration  in the curent  period
affects the identity  of the median voter over subsequmt redistributive  taxes and transfers.
I.r this paper we have studied an er-tremely  streqrnlined model in which ageuts  c€n lete  on one redistrib-
utive  policy pa.rameter,  the tsx  rate 0, which ultimately  determines the level of the tra.rsfer r.  In reality,
there a,re  a plethora of government policy lra,riables  and prograrftI that  carr be us€d to tra,nsfer  capital from
one group of people to others.
Our model also shows  how native residents'  preferences  over the qua.ntity of imuigration  a"re  i:rfluenced  by
various factors, i:rcluding the degree  of dornestic income or wealth inequality and the degree  of international
capital mobility.
Other things equal, increased  inequality h  the native population leads  the median native to be less  likely
to prefer high levels of immigration,  because  vrith higher inequality in the initial  distribution  of capital, the
median natire  is an individual  more reliant  oa labor income, hence more smsiti!€  to  the adverse effects
qrhich irnrnigration has ou the return  to Labor. At  higher degrees  of initiel  nati!€  inequality, irDmi$ation
leads to  higher taxes behg  chosen  by the subsequent median l'oter  who, because  of the high inequa.lity,
will  be relatively poor.  As initial  weelth inequality  shrinks, poorer natiws  become  relatively more wealthy
(relative to the ar€rage native) a:rd, as a resu-lt,  more sensitive to the higher return to capital which results
hom irnmigration.  In our para.:netrization,  if iaequality in the initial  distribution  of capital is low enough, a
majority  of natives prefer a high level of immigration  to zero irrmigration.
International  capital movements  can also hale  a significant impact on an economy's  openr:ess  to immi-
grants- br pa,rticular, the more mobile is intemational  capital, the less  likely is it that natil€s will be opposed
to iumigation-  This is because,  with  a constart  retums to scale techaology, equa.l  proportions of capital
and labor can be imported, leaving the retrrns  to labor and capital unchanged. We show that,  in fact, in
a world of perfect physical capital mobilitg  natiws  a.re  indifferent with  respect to the level of iynrni$ation.Increased  capital  mobility  also tends  to  result  in  a lorer  tax  rate  on income,  and  this  rate  approaches zem
as we approach  a state with  perfect  capital  mobility.
The  results  here  also show why  it  is iuappropriate  to  merely  study  the  effect  of  immigration  merely  by
alelyzing  the  impact  on wages or  elen  incomes.  In  a number  of our  experiments,  natives  o<perience rising
incomes  in  some periods  as a result  of immigration,  but  a,re  aonetheless  worse off in  terms  of lifetime  utility.
This  is because the  changes in  factor  prices  caused by  immigration  influence  the  savings decisions of trati!€s
in  ways  which  lead  these  natives  to  re.allocate  resources  from  earlier  to  later  periods.  Iucomes  in  Later
periods  may  be higher  as result,  but  the  agents are making  trade.offs  which  they  rould  not  in  the  absence
of immigration.
The  model  qlso sheds some light  on  other  factors  which  influence  native  residelts'  desire for  increased
inmi$ation,  including  the  wealth  levels  of  immigrants,  their  enfranchisement  to  vote  ouce admitted,  and
the  extent  to  which  they  can be denied  subsequent  benefiis,  and  1'et still  be unde  to  pay  taxes.
6  Appendix
6.1  Proof  of the proposition  regarding  perfect  capital  mobility
If .\:0  then ir  any equilibrium  it must be the case  that fuz:  l,  md  B (l -  0)ry:  1, or else  /{f  would
be *co  or -oo  in some  period.  Then, in the second  period of a.ny  agent's Jife he must solve the following
optimization  problem:
max  log  (g2  - s3)  + glog (tt-1s3  + (l -  0).2 + r),
which gi'oes  rise to the followiug indlect  utility  firnction:
I + A)bg(uz  + A  [(1  - B)  ras  + r])  .
It  should  be clea.r from  the previous  e:<pression that  the agent will  then  choose tbe tax  rete 0 to maximize
the  term  (1 -  0) ra3 +  T.  Note  that  this  implies  that  an  agent's  preferred  tax  rate  is independent  of  his  or
her level  of income-
Since r  :  d (reKs  +  4L\  I L,  it  is possible  to  show that
(r -  0)  u4 1 7 :  (L  - a + o,0)  A(ft/  L)".
Using  1  :  B(-Q4:  B$-fiaA(fu/I)"-1,  this  en:pression  can  be  written  as
(r-0)ws+r:  (1  -o+40)A[(1 - o)aBA]r+
Difier€ntiation  of this ecrpression  reveals  that it is concave  and maximized  when  d :  0.
25The remai:rder of the result follows ftom the fact that  with  0:0,  the condition Br2:  B4  =  I  then otr'
taias,  so  that K2/.L :  h/L  :  (aBA)\/(r--)  independent  of .L. As a result,  ru2  :  r'3 :  (1 -  a) A(aBA)'/11-"'  ,
also independent of tr.  Since taxes and tra,nsfers  are zero for any M,  a,ud  factor prices ale independmt of
M,  natives' opportunity  sets and equilibrium  utility  levels are independent of M  as well- I
6.2  Determination  of the tax  rate in a special case
In the special case  where there is no foreign capital, and agents have only capital income in the final petiod,
it  is possible to derive a simple closed-form solution for agents' prefered  ta). rates.  In this section of the
appendix, we preseat that  solution, which is usefr:I for ga,rnering  some htuition  regarding the relationship
between the eqfibrium  tax rate and median and average  second-period  income.
Suppose that,  then, there is no foreign capital--equivalently,  that  )  :  loo  and Kf  :  0----and  that
third-period  productior  possibilities a.re  giren by I'(K)  :  AK,  srt  that  the equilibrium  after-tax return to
saving is (1 -  d) A.  Consider an a€eut----€ither  a native or immigrant-who  begins period two with  income
equal to 99. Giren values for the tax rate 0 and transfer payment ?, the problem faced by such an agmt is
md  {Iog  (yz  -  sg)  + f log  l(1 -  0) As3  + rl}  .
It  is straightforwerd to veri{y that  the optimal choice of savings is given by
(18)
",:+  (o*-6_J-r-1^)
By aggregating this expression  across  all agents, and using the fact that  the lumpsum  transfer (r)  equals
the tax rate times the amount of per-capita capital income, it  can be shown that
By substituting  this expression,  together with  the equations determining optimal consumption and saving
decisions,  back into the utility  fi.rnction (18), we then get an indirect utility  function that describes  preferences
over these two periods, arld this can be written  as follows:
where 4 :  -  (1 + B) log (1 + B) + plog (BA).Writteu  in this manner, it  becomes  clea.r  that  a"n  irdividual's
indirect utility  depends  not or y on the parameters 0 a.nd  A, but  also on his 'rncome  rcIatiae to the awrfl,ge.
The reasou  for this is clear: the agent's resulting transfer payment depends  on the a\,€rage  lerel of income.
It  is straightforwa.rd to  verify  that  this  expression is difiermtiable  in  d, a.nd is decreasing  in  d when
Azf  ,z  >  7-i.e.,  when the agent is richer than arerage. The preferred tax rate of any agent with  U2  > 92 b
alwavs d :  0.
26For agents  with gr2/!2  < 1, one  ca.nlerify that ro is strictly concar,e  in d on (0,1). Concavity  is easier  to
see  if the two last terms involving d a,re  written  out as
r  .  /  \'r
(1  + B)  Ios  |  1t  + f) I  + 0B  (  | - I  )  | - (r  + irt  t"s  0 + B  - 0r)+  ploe  (1  - d),
L  lz  \  !z/l
which is the sum of three strictly  concave  firnctions.
Hence  a poorer-than-average  egent v/ho vrishes  to calculate his or her most preferred m,lue of 0 subj€ct to
the constraint d € [0, 1], could perform this calculation by merely takiag the derirative of w (0iy2/92),  and
setting it  equal to zero. This yields a quadratic expression  and after some  tedious algebra it  can be shown
that  the most preferred tax rate of ar  agent wil}i U2ly2 = z <  1 is given try
r et  : ff-t 
+  28  (t  - 
;I-  -'F  +EF4
Some properties of 9. (z)  a.re  worth  noting.  Firsi,  d* (z)  is decreasing iu  z:  the  relati.r.ely poorer is
an agent, the  higher is his or  her preferred ta>c  rate  (and tra,nsfer).  ALso, lim,-1  d. (z)  :  0, so there
is no discontinuity  in  the preferred tax rates as !€  move from  the relatively  wealthy-those  agents with
z )  1, whose preferred tax rate is zero-to  the relatirely  poor.  While  0* (z) la.ries monotonically with  z,
it's  dependence  on the time-preference  paxameter B is more complex.  Finally, as is shovrn in Dolmas and
Hufiman  [10], for sufficiently small r.alues  of z, 0'(z)  may be on the 'wrong'  side of the economy's Laffer
cune-i.e.,  for small z,0*  (z) may be higher than the value of d which maximizes total  tax revenue.
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Figure  2: Results  for  difiering  degrees  of inequality
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